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The chartered company period of Rhodesian history is now well charted 
territory. The rich resources of the National Archives of Rhodesia are high- 
paying ore whose excellent historical assay figures have been demonstrated 
again and again. The proximity of the University of Rhodesia, despite all its 
vicissitudes, has ensured constant activity. Company and settler politics, 
African primary resistance, land policy, labour policy, external relations, 
culture contact: all have been adequately examined. But there has been a hi& 
degree of compartmentalization. No one has attempted t o  examine in general terms 
the tripartite relationship among settlers, Company and Colonial Office in "native 
policy1' over a range of issues, and utilizing a combination of Company, Colonial 
Office, settler, and Rhodesian administrative sources. There has, moreover, been 
insufficient attention to regional variation in Rhodesia. This paper clearly 
cannot hope to do this: it simply embodies some su@?stions for further 
enquiry. 
A number of periods have been distinguished in white-black economic 
and political relations in Rhodesia in the period 1890-1925. These can be 
roughly tabulated in the following \my: 
1. 1890-1898: A period of unfettered Company activity, coupled with the 
abdication of Colonial Office responsibility, resulting in 
settler discontents, and culminating in the Shona-Ndebele 
rebellions of 1896-7. Land alienation is rapid; a reserves 
policy is less than half-hearted; and black-white economic 
relations constitute what Herman Merivale 50 years earlier 
might have called llamalgamationl' (l), thou& in this case of 
the crudest sort. 
2. 1898-1908: This period sees the growth of settler influence, and a 
restructuring of the econoqy from m i n i n g  to famhg. Reserves 
are extensive and diffuse. Through lobola, increased poll tax, 
and other taxes, cash demands upon Africans are considerable, 
and their response includes a great deal of cash cropping and 
sale of stock. llImportedll abour becomes the norm. 
3. 1908-1916: Because of growing and excessive cash demands, African movement 
from alienated and unalienated land to the reserves develops, 
carrying Africans furtner from opportunities for marketing, 
further from lines of communication, further from white 
employment. The labour response internally renains static (2), 
and the reserves prove in the short term poor suppliers of 
labour. Amone; the settlers the farming interest seems to be in 
tile ascendancy. The Colonial Office becomes conditioned to the 
possibility of reduction of the reserves (3) and this duly 
occurs with the report of the Coryndon reserves conrmission in 
1916. The reserves are reduced by more than a million acres 
nett, but, more important, exchanges of territory increase 
their concentration, their remoteness, and their poverty of 
resources. 
4. 1916-1925: African movement continues. Overpopulation and overstocking 
make African entry to the cash economy by means other than 
labour increasingly difficult. A static labour supply is 
transformed into an over-abundant one. The Privy Council 
decision of 1918 on the status of unalienated land virtually 
destroys the Company's position, unwittingly gives the settlers 
their head, and leads to the headlong rush to the "leap in the 
dark" of Responsible Government. Settler rule, despite imperial 
reservation of native affairs, proves rather less amenable to 
control by the Colonial Office than the Company had been. 
Paradoxically, as the sole legitimate entry to the European 
economy becomes paid labour, the f'drive to segregation" 
proceeds. (4) 
The progression seems clear: economic integration, together with 
African multiple response to the cash economy, shading into a developing reserves 
policy of growing exclusiveness, coupled with the long march of settler influence. 
Put another wap, the development is from a situation in which the capitalist 
economy is dependent upon the surplus of the indigenous economy to a situation in 
which the ca?italist economy is self-sufficient, and opportunities for surplus 
are stifled by land hunger. !he cash nexus becomes restricted to paid labour, 
and labour hunger is transformed into labour abundance. From the settler 
viewpoint, it is an attractive development, producing social and political 
separation out of economic necessity, and pressed forward by a series of 
carefully calculated policies like the Company rent on unalienated land in 1900, 
the Private Locations Ordinance of the same year, and the contraction of the 
reserves in 1916. 
%'he argument of this paper will be that these developments do not 
constitute a linear progression, that they are produced as much unwittingly as I 
wittingly, that the greatest single influence was the Colonial Office, that the I 
inconsistencies of Colonial Office policy inadvertently, and sometimes overtly, l 
favoured the settler interest, and that certain policies - like the Company rent 
and the Private bcations Ordinance - produced very different results from those l 
intended. The greatest motivating factor on the Colonial Office side seems to , 
have been an almost obsessional distaste for and distrust of the Company, which 
reached its apogee in the years preceding Responsible Government. Similarly, in 
a cmious side-show, Fketer Hall, particularly represented by the Anti-Slavery 
l 
and Abori#,nest Protection Society, though by no means in consonance with the 
Colonial Office, likewise c-ied its loathing of the BSA CO, to the extent even 
of supporting the Responsible Government party of the settlers before 1923. (5) 
There can be little doubt that without the intervention of the Colonial 
Office, provoked principally by the Shona-Ndebele rebellions, the Company would 
have pursued an integrationist economic policy. The nature of the early 
Rhodesian econonly, the fact that many pioneers saw themselves as temporary 
visitors out to make a pile (6), and the predilections of most expressed opinion 
in the early years, all point to the levying of labour and the receipt of 
African produce on a localized basis. African response to marketing opportunities 
led, it was true, to insufficient labour supply, but many recognized that the 
Iflabour problem" was by andlarge a myth. The fact that there were frequent 
surpluses proved that the labour problem was based not on insufficient 
population, nor on natural indolence, but upon low wages, enomous disincentives 
like death rates, defaulting on pw, disease, the ticket system of payment, and 
the refusal to provide location plots for families. Among the Ndebele 
particularly, labour mipation was a procedure known from the 1870s (75, and 
considerable emigration to %he Rand and even further afield throughout the 
period reflected the genuine llpulltl of paid labour. (8) Moreover, the inte- 
connections between the two economies were quickly recognized, as the enormous 
increase in the acquisition of ploughs, broken oxen and development of stock- 
holding testify. 
But the Colonial Office insisted on a reserves policy from the start, 
at least from the introduction of the first tax. In 1894, the Company levied a 
tax illegally (g); the Colonial Office acquiesced, but insisted upon the 
institution of reserves as a auid u m  auo. It waa by now colonial orthodow, 
hallowed by the practice of Shepstone in Natal, despite the opposition of such 
great colonial theorists as the third Earl Grey and He- Merivale. For 
Shepstone, it had been an administrative expedient; in the future it was to 
become a means of political and social segregation. That the Company viewed the 
policy in an entirely half-hearted way is amply reflected in the provision of 
the Gwaai and Shangani reserves, remote, waterless, a sop to metropolitan 
opinion, no more. Later, when reserves were demarcated by officials in 1896/97, 
they were multitudinous and scattered. &in, there is not the slightest hint 
of segregation. They were in many ways simply confinnations of existing 
occupation patterns. They were selected and surveyed in a haphazard fashion (10); 
they were added to and subtracted from almost by native commissioner fiat; 
their boundaries were lost and found, or stayed lost. (11) They were 
integmtionist, but their untidiness was their downfall. The tidy minds of the 
Colonial Office mandarins desired a tidy policy settled in perpetuity as an 
African insurance in a time of gmwing settler power. It was this yeanrLng for 
order and permanency which led to the Coryndon Land Commission, pressed upon the 
Company by the Colonial Office. (12) Plore will be said about the Commission 
below. 
The Company seemed to remain consistent in its economic amalgarnationist 
policy. H. Wilson Fox, in his memoranda of 1910 and 1912, drawn up for the 
Board of the Company, attacked reserves and tribalism. He reached the logical 
concLusion that there had to be a pennanent labour policy and quoted with 
approval a resolution of the fazmerst conference of 1911 that labourers from 
north of the Zambezi should be allowed to bring their families with them and 
settle permanently. (13) Whenever a differential tax on labour performance was 
mooted, it was alwa~rs objected that this would discriminate against those 
Africans who cash-cropped and would benefit only the employers of labour. (14) 
This again is scarcely a segregationist policy. Moreover, native codssioners 
constantly attacked removals to reserves. The NC, Eulawayo, pleaded for the 
setting up of a permanent labour force around the town, as the African 
depopulation of a belt 60 miles around the town was seriously dmaging its 
labour supply. (15) The Company bought a farm and attempted to turn it into 
plots as late as 1920, but was thwarted by a settler hue and cry. (16) 
The Colonial Office view was not too far removed from this. In 1915, 
during discussions on making adultery a criminal offence, Sir John Anderson, 
permanent under-secretary, minuted: 
The remedy is to let the young men who leave their 
kraals to work to take their wives with them. (17) 
Both Ha.rcourt and his paxliamentary unde-secretary in 1915, Lord Islington, 
favoured the establishment of African permanent occupation around Bulawayo on 
plots. (18) But, when it came to labour immigration from beyond the Zambezi, 
the Colonial Office believed both in repatriation and in deferred pay. (19) 
So, while the Colonial Office thowt ultimately in terms of pemanent labour, 
it also provided the climate and the means for future segmgation. 
Nowhere were the confusions of chartered company rule and the problems 
of Colonial Office control more ap~arent than in labour recruiting policy. 
Internally, the main concern of the Colonial Office was, of course, to prevent 
forced labour, while recognizing the great difficulty in distinguishing among 
"nice degrees of moral suasion". (20) The undoubted and frequent instances of' 
forced labour before the rebellions, when the native administration consisted 
of - in the deathless words of one native commissioner in his memoirs - a gmup 
of llnigger tamers" (21); the apparent attempt at forcing labour in 1899 (22); 
frequent renewed suspicions in subsequent years; the mming battle between the 
missionary Cripps and the NC Posselt in the Charter district (23): all convinced 
the Colonial Office that recruitment should never lie in the hands of the native 
administration. The fear was well substantiated, but the Colonial Office went 
on from there to insist that there should be no administrative involvement at 
all. The dilemma was well seen by that shrewdest and most inquisitive of all 
the Colonial Office's sets of "eyes and earsn, Sir I+Iarshall Clarke, the Resident 
Commissioner. The series of independent labour bureaux, capitalized by their 
clients, and at first largely unsuccessful, seemed to Clarke to comtitute a 
shirking of responsibility on the part of the Coqany administration. 
Considering Clarkets indictment of native commissioner recruitment, the Colonial 
Office thought Clarke to be indulging in a volte face. (24) The distinction 
between administrative involvement in organization of labour and administrative 
involvement in recruiting was made in the 1906 Native Labour Committee of 
Enquiry, the Native Affairs Cormnittee of Ehqui of 1910-11, and again in the 
Native Labour Cormnittee of Enquiry of 1921. (23 In aqy Crown Colony labour 
policy would have been in the hands of the colonial government. By attempting 
to remove the Company, which could be controlled by an efficient Resident 
Commissioner, the Colonial Office was moving the centre of gravity in 
influencing labour policy to the settlers through the bureaux. 
In 1901, when the labour policy was framed, the Colonial Office had 
the air of panic, mainly because the Boer War had held up Clarkecs despatches 
in Cape Town for over a year. (26) The confusion was compounded when it became 
clear that the Company administration waa to be the protector of immigrant 
labour (apart from those from Portuguese East Africa: after the Tete Agreement 
of 1913, the Portuguese sent their own "Protectorvt). (27) It must have been 
with a wry smile that Sir William ~~, Governor of Nyasaland, having banned 
the emigration of labourers to Rhodesia, hinted that he might be more forthcoming 
in his labour relations with Rhodesia if the Company administration had more 
direct control over labour. (28) 
So far as immigrant labour is concerned, it is clear from all the 
many immipation and recruitirag schemes, open and clandestine, of the Company 
that it had no fears whatsoever of increasing population imbalance. (29) The 
Company would have liked, too, Africans from Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and 
Ibzambique to have brou&t their wives and settled permanently. (30) Just such 
a policy was attempted as late as 1917 when over 11,000 Africans crossed the 
border from Nozambique during fikkombe~s rebellion. (31) But no colonial 
administration, company (32) or otherwise, was prepared to see such a population 
drain. The export and constant re-export of labour, together with deferred pay 
provisions, was a vital sector of the economies of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland 
and, above all, Ebzambique. Only in Katanga was there an attempt even before 
the First World War to stabilize the labour force through permanent immigration, 
a policy calculated to produce more unskilled efficiency and also a body of 
skilled African labour. (33) But,with the approval of the Colonial Office, 
proprietorial instincts were strong enough to thwart permanent migration. 
The general animus against the Southern Rhodesia Company administration 
was particularly obvious in this question of external recruitment. In any 
conflict with South African interests, Rhodesia tended to lose. For the High 
Cormnisaioner, Rhodesia was very much a fringe problem, and after 1910 there was 
of course the added complication that, as Governo-General of the Union, he was 
subject to the advice of his ministers. (34) In other colonial conflicts the 
Colonial Office was happy to side against the Company. Curzon, as might be 
expected, treated the Company with nothing but contempt in all discussions about 
Indian labour. (35) And the Colonial Office was quick to support baning in his 
attempt to cut off labour to Southern Wodesia in 1911, although the poverty of 
Nyasaland, and of the policy, were soon made apparent by the extent of illegal 
migration. 
The labour bureaux,throu& which mainly northern recruitment was 
conducted, were never a great success. The best labourers avoided them; the 
worst employers used them. Death rates among their recruits were higher, and, 
despite the advantages of carefully regulated travel, they were alwa~rs 
extremely unpopular amongst Africans themselves. Too much success was itself 
-row, as in the period of ove-supply just before the First World War. When 
at one stage Rhodesian employers agreed to take 20025% of their labour from the 
bureau, which were by this time recruiting only North of the Zambezi, it was 
clear that irmnigmnt labour waa to be given precedence over internal. One 
African chief noted this, and complained to his native commissioner. (36) The 
Colonial Office fears of Company administrative involvement had led to a 
concentration on outside labour, which in turn fostered the settler mentality 
that internal labour was of a similar kind, to be extracted and returned at wi11.(37) 
The development of this mentality seemed to have policy expressions in 
the Company rent on unalienated land of 1908, a policy introduced primarily to 
solve a cash shortage of the ever-penurious Company. H. Wilson Fox, as well as 
noting its revenue possibilities, even suggested that it mi&t encourage cash 
cropping. (38) The ever present conflict between the commercial and administrative 
interest of the Company was never more obvious than in this issue. The rent 
was collected by the native commissioners and went straight into the Companyts 
commercial coffers. (39) In the same year, the Private Locations Ordinance was 
passed. (40) This measure was designed to regulate "private locations" upon 
alienated land in order to provide for the administration greater control over 
the conditions of African tenancy. As it emerged from the Legislative Council, 
however, much changed by the farming interest, it was clearly directed against 
laxge absentee landowners and their practice of "kaffir farmingtt. The motives 
were mixed, but certainly amongst them was the desire to persuade some of the 
absentee companies to develop their lands or even to release some of them. So 
far as working farmers and landowners were concerned, the ordinance was designed 
to provide them with greater labour control over tenants by permitting "labour 
agreements". These could be in lieu of rent; they could even be - as in the 
Plelsetter district - in return for payment of tax. Provided no rent was charged, 
regardless of the scope of the labour agreements, landowners did not have to pay 
tax on private locations provided for in the ordinance. In the event, however, 
those who did not le~y labour increased the rent: the absentee landowners, 
subject to a higher tax on their tenants, to a considerable extent. Where labour 
was levied, Africans were made all too aware, as native commissioners testify, 
of their loss of freedom. 
In fact, by. both these policies, together with the imposition of grazing 
fees in 1912, the Company and the settlers oveereached themselves. Greater cash 
demands had acted as a stimulant to labour in the past, and did so temporarily 
again: until the last few years of the chartered period, reserves tended to show 
the poorest labour returns. But as the exactions became too m a t  the movement 
began. Native Commissioners deplored the whole process. Some, trying to divine 
the confused intentions of the Ordinance, reported that it was not working, by 
which they meant that labour was not being extracted, and Africans were heading 
for the reserves. (41) One excellent insight is provided by the NC Phzoe, Drew, 
who reported in 1913 that the stringency of the agreements under the Ordinance 
varied according to the proximity to the reserves. (42) Lrwdowners close to a 
reserve could not risk so severe an agreement as those further away, a clerrr 
admission that the motive of many landowners was to extort as much rent as 
possible consistent with retaining their labour supply. 
The best insi&ts that can be obtained into the land/labour nexus and 
the confused thinking behind measures which appear in retrospect to have had a 
single end in view lie in a local and regional study of the native administration 
in Ilhodesia. A great deal of work remains to be done in this field. A close 
examination of native commissionerst reports throughout the period reveals tlmt 
lhshonaland was a poor supplier of labour compared with Matabeleland. In 1904, 
the statistical returns of fkshonaland and Matabeleland revealed that 2194 of the 
able-bodied male population in the former province and 46% in the latter had been 
to work for a minirmun of three months. (43) Before this, the discrepancy had been 
even greater, and it only gradually evened out later. It is clearly unsatisfactory 
to attribute this - as it was by many contemporaries - to the inherent laziness 
of the Shona. 
The Shona, a predominantly ag?5cultural people, were more closely 
wedded to the soil than the Ndebele. l"loreover, the Ndebele lost far more in 
terms of cattle and land in the post-Matabele War and rebellions period; there 
is evidence that their better response to paid labour was prompted by a desire 
to recoup their herds. The Ndebele had a longer tradition of contact with 
Europeans and were, in the face of the rigours of the mines, a physically 
stronger and more resilient people. Noreover, the Shona appear to have been more 
easily demoralized by the influx of labour from outside. Their attachment to 
thelr home territory precluded them from competing with immigmnts in the length 
of time they were prepaxed to work. There is also some evidence that they 
found the movement to the reserves a more distressing and unsettling experience. 
In addition, the factor of population gmwth seems to have been greater 
in Iktabeleland than in 1.lashona;land. In the crucial years lgO2-lgl2, admittedly 
using only the most crude population figures, there seems to have been a growth 
factor of 56% in l4atabeleland and of 3876 in Mashonaland. (44) With more settled 
conditions, some good harvests, a vast increase in stock, and rudimentary health 
provisions, the African population doubled in the period 1898-1914, a1thoug-h it 
should be remembered that early estimates may have been too low, and the ~Mopean 
operations in the fktabele War and the subsequent rebellions slaughtered large 
numbers of the population. In 1898 the Chief Native Commissioner of Iktabeleland 
reported that females outnumbered males by 4 to 1. (45) The larger factor of 
growth can to some extent be seen as a re-establishment of the balame.(46) 
Possibly as a result or^  the respective performance of their two 
provinces, the chief native commissioners of Ihtabeleland and Mashonaland assumed 
somewhat different stances over the reserves issue. W. S. Taberer in Kashonaland 
w a s  uncompromising in his attack on the reserves system. He regarded them as a 
means of demoralization, of excluding Africans from "the beneficient influence of 
the white mant1, maintaining the position of the chiefs whose substantial power 
had been taken over by the government. (47) He attacked the imposition of the 
Company rent, and he wrote of European farmers who threw Africans off their land 
and then complained about the shortage of labour. 
Taylor in I~tabeleland, on the other hand, having burned his fingers in 
the Colonial Office fires over the forced labour issue in 1899, attuned himself 
more to Company policy as modified by known Colonial Office attitudes. In 
consequence, when Taberer left Rhodesia in 1913, Taylor became Chief Native 
Commissioner for the whole territory. He attacked the backwardness of the 
reserves, but not their existence. In 1912, he wrote to the Administrator: 
"The development of the reserves, thereby increasing the wants of the natives, 
is the true solution of the labour difficulty." (4.8) This was scarcely a 
realistic policy at a time when the bulk of the African population of Rhodesia 
were withdrawing further from the centres of European employment, further from 
the stores and mining compounds that stimulated such wants, f'urther in many 
cases from the best agricultural land. The process would eventually be 
reversed by the gross overcrowding of reserves, but in a very real sense it was 
the moderate party, complying with the Colonial Office desire for a haven for 
African population at a time when eventual African political power was 
unthinkable, which most successfully pushed forward the development of land 
segrega,tion, and the mortgaging of the Africans@ political future. 
Both in 1901, when the Colonial Office formulated a policy on labour 
that was to lead to great confusion and much misconception, and in 1916 when it 
permitted the reduction of reserves without fully appreciating either the extent 
of exchange in quality, the ma&tude of migration at the time, or the fashion 
in which the reserves were to be used to promote segregation, the Office wrrs 
distracted by war. That the Colonial Office failed to see the segregationist 
possibilities of the reserves is clear from reactions to the report of the Land 
Commission. One official, Betterbee, refused to contemplate the provision of 
one million acres llreserve reserves", on the grounds that more and more Africans 
would came out to work and not need reserves. Sir Henry Lambert, Assistant 
Under Secretary, minuted: 
Reserves are necessary in the early stages of 
white settlement when the uncivilised tribal 
native has neither the habit nor the power of 
work, but the idea that the native has an 
inalienable right to vegetate in reserves 
while the white man has to work does not seem 
to me to be either just or even good for the 
native. (49) 
then, in 1918, the judicial committee of the Privy Council found that 
the unalienated land accrued to the Company only in its administrative capacity, 
the Companyts interest in maintaining African settlement upon it vanished. Sale I 
for the hi&est possible price to offset administrative deficits was now essential l 
From that moment, settlers, Colonial Office and Exeter Hall all played the game of 
"get the C~mpany~~. It had even been asserted in the Colonial Office that,& any 
conflict between the Company and the elected members, the elected members must be 
1 4 
supported in order to avoid strained relations after the end of the Charter. (TO) 1 
In terms of the African interest, it was a dangerous game. 
After the First World War, when African movement to the reserves was 
being completed, inflationary pressures were making wants more difficult to satisfy 
(l), and the prices of stock and grain were plummeting, the Colonial Office 
was again distracted by a succession of crises in Egypt, in Kenya, in Ireland. 
White settlers got their political heads just when the terms were turning against 
African participation in the cash economy. The Africans' situation vis-bvis 
the land, and the attitude of the settlers towards migrant labour, had been 
produced by Colonial Office policies that seemed both liberal and protective. 
In the long term this was not so, but in 1923 no one, and certainly not Exeter 
Iiall, was prescient eno- to notice. The problems of the liberal and 
humanitarian position, based, of course, on a misunderstanding of educational and 
political development, are no better reflected than in their support for the 
findings of the Morris Carter Land Commission, and the Land Apportionment Act that 
followed. 
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